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In the past two decades, many governments have privatized their state-owned companies in
the interest of improving the efficiency of these companies that are able to operate
commercially. When a price is struck to determine the value of the company being sold in
the market, the value will depend on the after-tax profits earned after the company is
privatized. Amongst many factors that influence the price at which the company is sold, an
important variable to determine is the tax burden of the company. If sellers and buyers
overestimate the amount of taxes to be paid after the privatization, the price at which the
company sold will be too low.  The converse will hold when the taxes are underestimated.
Thus, it is very important for governments and investors to know the prevailing tax regime
affecting the company after privatization.
Usually, a state-owned company is not responsible to pay company taxes and certain
indirect taxes, such as capital and property taxes. When the company is privatized, the
company must then be subject to new forms of taxes that were previously not levied on the
state-owned firm.  Specifically, three types of issues arise when state-owned companies are
privatized and become taxable:
*  Transition issues: Many aspects of the tax base are related to "time": for example,
under the income tax, carryovers for losses and tax credits, deductions for
depreciation and cost of borrowing, and capital gains treatment. At the time of
privatization, how are assets to be valued for the calculation of capital gains and
cost deductions for tax purposes? Are the assets transferred to the new owners at
fair market value, book value or its cost for tax purposes? How should the
treatment of the often extraordinarily high debt load carried on by the to-be-
3privatized company be valued for tax purpose?  The determination of the transfer
value of assets may depend on the law of the country. In some cases, there may
be no law at all since tax authorities never dealt with the issue prior to the time
when privatization were being considered. Yet, the amount of tax payable by the
shareholders after the firm is privatized can be affected substantially by the tax
policies applied at the time of transition.
*  Economic Efficiency Issues: Privatization is usually undertaken to improve
economic efficiency by "leveling the playing field" among producers, especially if
the state-owned company is in competition with domestic or foreign investor-
owned companies. Such competition between state-owned and investor-owned
producers is found in many countries, especially in utility, banking, transportation
and communication, trade and resource industries. Prior to a privatization, it is
quite common that tax policies evolve in such a way to offset the advantage that
untaxed state-owned companies have in competition with taxable investor-owned
companies. If a company is to be privatized, how would tax policy be applied on
the new entity compared to its competitors? Will the tax policies affecting the
industry need to be revised in light of the privatization? For example, if
governments gave concessions to small-scaled investor-owned power producers
competing with large-scaled state-owned power companies, should the tax
treatrnent of both the new privatized and existing private producers be adjusted to
remove previous tax incentives defined by the production scale or other features?
Or should the new state-owned company be given the same tax benefits as
existing producers? Consequently, the amount of taxes paid by the newly
privatized firm can be significantly affected by evolving changes to tax policies.
4*  Revenue Transfersfor  Governments: A state-owned company, whose profits
accrue to the owning government (national, state/provincial or municipal
governments), will possibly pay taxes directed to it and other governments after
the privatization. Although the investors are indifferent as to which government
they pay taxes, the governnent will certainly care about the revenues that they
should receive after the privatization. Privatization may lead to a transfer of
revenue from the selling government to other governments that obtain new
sources of tax revenue from the privatized firm. In some cases, the selling
government may seek alternative taxing manner after the pnvatization to make up
for the potential revenue loss, which may or may not change after-tax profits
received by the shareholders compared to that resulted from the statutory tax
structure.
A more detailed discussion providing a checklist of tax issues for policymakers is
provided in the following section. To illustrate the tax issues that are listed, we consider in
the following sections the privatization of Ontario Hydro. Recently, the Ontario government,
as its owner, considered privatizing Ontario Hydro but rejected the policy in favour of a
major restructuring of the industry in which Ontano Hydro would have to compete with
investor-owned producers in both the generation and distribution of electrical power. The
province is also requiring Ontario Hydro to pay taxes to the Ontario government as if it were
a privatized company. Thus, many of the tax issues arising from privatization apply to the
Ontario Hydro case as well.
Surprisingly, very little has been written about the tax treatment of new privatized
companies.  Most of the privatization literature, for example as illustated  by Vickers and
5Yarrow [1988] and Newbery and Green [1996], provide a detailed discussion about the
economic performance of the privatized companies, including valuation issues. Tax issues
are rarely discussed and often treated in a simplified way.'  Taxes are viewed as a simple
proportional reduction in profits at the company level and dividends and capital gains/losses
at the personal level.  The purpose of this paper is to rectify the limited treatment of tax issues
by providing policy makers a checklist of tax issues that are related to privatization.
II.  A CHECKLIST OF TAXING ISSUES WITH PRIVATIZATION
Suppose a government decides to privatize an existing company. To keep our discussion as
simple as possible, investors and the government use a common discount rate to determine
the present value of income earned by the firm over time.  To estimate the appropriate value
at which shares are sold, the seller and purchasers must estimate the value of the firm. Let Vg
be the transaction value of the shares for the government and Vp  - T, be the value of the firm
to the purchasers, gross of the transaction value paid to the government with T denoting the
present value of risky taxes to be paid by the privatized company. The government is willing
to sell the firm if
Vg+T  v*,  (1)
v* denoting the value of the firm as a state-owned company to the government, i.e., the value
would accrued to the govenmment  if there is no privatization. The investors are willing to buy
the firm if
Vp-T-Vg  O,orVp  T+Vg  (2)
Combining equations (1) and (2) entails Vp v *  . This implies that the privatization will take
place if the privatized value of the firm for the investors, gross of taxes and the transaction
lAfter  undertaking a literature search, we found very few papers on tax issues related to privatization. One
6price for shares, is at least as great as the value of the firm to the government if it were not
privatized. Taxes therefore result in a redistribution of revenues from the private investors to
the government. Given that Vp  is constant, the greater the amount of taxes paid by the firm,
the lower the transaction price Vg  as seen from equation (2).
Therefore, taxes play an important role in determining how revenues are split between
the government and investors. Any over- (under-) estimation of taxes would result in the
transaction price (Vg)  being under- (over-) estimated. Thus, it is important for both tax
authorities and the investors to understand how taxes will be applied after the firm is
privatized.
The amount of taxes to be paid by the firm after the privatization will depend on three
sets of issues, as discussed in the introduction. The first is related to transition issues - the
amount of tax paid after privatization will depend on the valuation of assets and liabilities at
the time of the privatization. The second is related to efficiency issues that can affect
economic performance of the industry since the privatized firm competes with other
producers.  The third is related to the transfer of revenue from one government to another as a
result of privatization.
1.  Transition Issues
At the time of privatization, the assets and liabilities of the company are assessed not only in
terms of their fair market value but also in termns  of tax values that are used to assess tax
liabilities after the privatization. There are a host of issues that need to be considered by tax
authorities and investors in determining the amount of taxes to be paid overtime. Below, we
provide a list of transition issues, which is not exhaustive.
paper that was found was Sinclair [1988] that reviewed income tax aspects of privatization in Canada.
7*  Valuation of Tangible and Intangible Assets: Normally, under corporate income tax rules
of a country, the transfer of assets from the old to new owners as a result of a merger of
investor-owned companies - including fixed assets, inventory, goodwill and depletable
assets - are transacted in a range between the fair market value and the tax-determined
cost of the asset.  Depreciation of assets is based on tax rules for calculating capital cost
allowances, not book depreciation. If the fair market value of assets is used and there is a
capital gain, the seller pays taxes on capital gains on the difference between the sale price
and the original cost of the asset and income tax on recaptured depreciation. 2 If there is a
capital loss, the seller may be able to apply the capital losses against capital gains of other
years through carryover provisions. The purchaser, whose assets are valued at the fair
market value, is able to claim depreciation deductions and other cost deductions at the
bumped up (down) value of assets. If an explicit rollover 3 is provided, the assets may be
transferred at the undepreciated cost that allows the seller to defer capital gains taxes.  On
the other hand, the purchaser is required to use the undepreciated cost of assets to value
the assets. Investors may be able to elect whether to transfer the assets at a price no
greater than fair market value and no less than the undepreciated cost base of assets. If
capital gains taxes paid by the seller are greater than the present value of tax writeoffs for
2 Recaptured  depreciation  is either  the difference  between  the smallest  of the original  or disposition  value  and
the undepreciated  capital  cost  of the asset.
3  The general  rule under  the Canadian  Income  Tax  Act is that  a capital  gain or loss must  be recognized  for tax
purposes  in the year  it is realized  by the taxpayer.  However,  in  certain  circumstances  where  a taxpayer's
economic  interest  in a capital  property  remain  unchanged,  a deferral  of any capital  gain is pennitted  until the
time  of disposal  of the property  received  in exchange.  The permission  for such  a deferral  is commonly  called  a
"rollover".  The Act provides  an elective  provision  under  which  a taxpayer  may dispose  of eligible  property  to a
taxable  Canadian  corporation  without  the immediate  income  tax consequences  that would  ordinarily  result  from
the disposition.  The general  purpose  of the provision  is to permit  a disposition  of eligible  property  to a taxable
Canadian  corporation  on a rollover  basis.  That  is, in  a manner  whereby  the disposing  party  avoids  some  or all of
the tax that  would  otherwise  arise  on disposition  and  the corporation  inherits  this as a potential  liability.  The
center  piece of this provision  is a joint election  by the disposing  party  and  the corporation  in  which  they elect  an
amount  that  will be deemed  to be the disposing  party's  proceeds  of disposition  and the corporation's  cost  of the
property.  For details,  refer  to CCH,  Canadian  Master  Tax Guide.
8the buyer, then it may be advantageous  both to the seller and purchaser to elect the
rollover treatment that would provide a tax-free exchange of assets.
The valuation of assets upon change of control would impact on the amount of
taxes to be paid after a company is privatized. The government, as the original owner,
will not be paying capital gains taxes.  Therefore, it is to the purchaser's tax advantage to
value assets at prices that would be at their highest value when the assets are transferred
to the new owners. If the company has been successful, the fair market value is likely
greater than the cost basis of the assets. The purchaser would prefer the assets to be
bumped up to the fair market value. However, should the fair market value be below the
tax-determined cost of the assets, it would be preferable for the buyer to have the cost
basis of the assets used so as to maximize depreciation deductions and minimize
payments of any future capital gains taxes. When the transaction price for the sale of the
company is determined, the valuation of the assets for tax purposes can have a significant
impact on the taxes paid after privatization. To the extent that the rule is known
beforehand, the purchaser would reduce its offer price for the company if assets were
transferred at the lowest price for tax purposes. The government would be willing to
accept a lower offer price so long as it received the expected taxes that is gained from
higher capital gains taxes and reduced cost deductions for depreciation and other
purposes.
*  Carryforwards of losses and deductions 4: When companies incur losses for income tax
purposes, they are able to carryforward the unused losses and deductions to be written off
future taxable profits.  When there is a change of control of a company involving two
4  Similar  issues  arise  with  minimum  taxes  which  are used  in a number  of developing  countries.  A company
may be required  to pay a presumptive  tax that  is credited  against  the corporate  income  tax. If the corporate
9taxpayers, the purchaser may use unused tax losses carried forward from earlier years
under certain restricted conditions. For example, losses accumulated prior to the sale of
the company may be only applied against the income earned from assets used in a
continuing and similar line of business. Otherwise, losses may be extinguished upon
change of control. 5 However, when the government privatizes a company, the company
may not have been paying taxes in the past.  There are no carryforwards of unused losses
and deductions unless parties agree to estimate such carryforwards and permit a transfer
of deductions. Again, the amount of taxes to be paid by the privatized firm will depend
on how carryforwards are handled.
*  Forgiveness of Debt: If a taxpayer is forgiven from repaying monies borrowed from
creditors, the amount forgiven may be added to the income of the borrower or used to
reduce capital losses or capital cost. 6 The creditor is permitted to write off the bad debt
from taxable income.  When a state-owned company is privatized, there may be
substantial amounts of "stranded debt" that is to be paid back to creditors. The
government might assume the responsibility to repay the debt so that the new privatized
company will not be crippled by high leverage. However, the transfer of the stranded
debt to the government is a forgiveness of debt and could be viewed as assistance
provided to the company.  Such forgiven amounts could be used to reduce the cost basis
of assets transferred to the privatized investor-owned company (thereby reducing tax
depreciation deductions so to increase the income tax liability, and increasing capital gain
liabilities on disposition of assets after the privatization). Alternatively, the forgiveness
income  tax is less  than  the  presumptive  tax, the excess  amount  of presumptive  tax is carried  forward  to later
tears to reduce corporate income taxes in later years. See Chen and Mintz [1993b].
The Canadian rule is that non-operating losses may be carried forward and applied against profits of a
"similar" line of business.  Unused capital losses carried forward are lost upon change of control.
6  For example, refer to Canadian Income Tax Act, Section 80.
10of debt may be treated as taxable income received by the state-owned company prior to
privatization, thereby reduce the debt ratio of assets to be transferred through
privatization, which would result in a higher income tax liability compared to the original
high leverage level.  Clearly, the rule used for the treatment of forgiven debt can have a
significant impact on taxes to be paid after the privatization.
Withholding taxes: Dividends, interest, royalties and fees are subject to withholding tax
when paid to non-residents. International tax treaties may reduce withholding tax rates
and a government may exempt interest paid to non-residents holding public debt
instruments. 7 Thus, prior to the time of a privatization, interest paid by the state-owned
company may be exempt from tax. Following privatization, the interest may now be
subject to withholding tax. Non-resident lenders may charge greater interest on funds lent
to the privatized company since the withholding tax may not be credited against taxes
owing to their own governments. Higher interest rates on debt would therefore reduce the
profitability of the privatized company. Should such interest become subject to non-
resident withholding tax, it would be necessary to at least grandfather existing debt
obligations from the withholding tax until the term of the loan is complete.
*  Capital and Property Taxes: In many countries, businesses are responsible to pay
property taxes on real estate values or a proxy for value and, in a few countries, be
responsible for payment of taxes on their assets or capital. 8 A state-owned company may
be exempt from such taxes. Therefore, at the time of privatization, the tax basis of the
assets may need to be determined. The assets could be valued according to their original
7For  example,  Canada  and  the United  States  both  exempt  from  withholding  tax interest  paid  on debt  obligations
under  the Canada-U.S.  treaty.
8 A number  of Latin  American  companies  have  capital  taxes  that are a form  of minimum  tax.
11cost (net of book depreciation) or at fair market value.  If fair market value is used, the
privatized company will pay greater (lower) property or capital taxes if the fair market
value is more (less) than the book value of assets.
*  Pension contributions: In many countries, employers may contribute to pension plans on
behalf of their employees. The tax treatment of pension earnings can vary significantly
across countries resulting in different impacts. One such tax treatment, found in the
United States and Canada, is the following. The pension contributions are deductible
from taxable company profits like wages and salaries and placed into accounts for
employees. The contributions are not treated as an immediate tax benefit for the
employee since the employee would have been able to receive an equivalent tax
deduction for individual contributions equal to the tax benefit.  The contributions and
accumulated income earned are withdrawn as pension payments and fully taxed in the
hands of the employee. 9 In principle, therefore, the company pension plan becomes a
mechanism that allows employees to defer taxable wages to retirement years.  It is also a
savings instrument for the employee.
If the employer is a state-owned company that becomes privatized, an issue arises
in regard to the tax treatment of pension contributions. The employer contributions were
not deductible since the state-owned company was not taxable; yet, when the funds are
withdrawn later, the employee is fully taxed on withdrawals of contributions and
accumulated income.  It may be argued that there is "unfairness" in that the contributions
prior to the privatization did not provide tax savings even though the contributions are to
be taxed upon withdrawal. Thus, contributions prior to the privatization should be
deducted from the profits of the company after it is privatized. On the other hand, it may
12be argued that no correction is needed. Since the employees are effectively given a
taxable benefit that is fully offset by an equivalent contribution that they would make to
the pension plan, then there is no need to provide special recognition of the employer
contributions prior to the privatization. In general, the tax issues that arise will depend on
the type of tax treatment afforded to pension earnings.
There are other potentially important transition issues related the conversion of state-
owned into privatized investor-owned companies. The transition issue will depend on the
existing tax law, which varies from country to country. The above examples serve to
illustrate the complexities that are involved with assessing taxes on companies when they
become privatized.
2.  Economic efficiency issues
Taxation can have a significant impact on the performance of an economy. In particular,
taxes may impede economic efficiency by distorting relative prices that operate as signals for
consumers and producers as to how they should best allocate their scarce resources.  Uneven
tax burdens across industries and businesses will result in a misallocation of resources by
encouraging producers to invest in relatively more favourably-taxed relative to less
favourably-taxed activities. In certain situations, it may be appropriate to levy differential tax
burdens on producers to correct for market failures such as those related to environmental
damage or insufficient innovative activity. However, in many situations, differential tax
burdens arise since governments may wish to provide assistance to specific firms for political
reasons rather than for some specific economic policy objective.
While there may be economic arguments that certain types of products to be subject to
differential taxes, it is unclear that, within an industry, businesses should face differential tax
9 In some countries,  pensions  may  not be subject  to tax.
13burdens that can result in greatest degree of inefficiency. There are three aspects of the tax
system that could lead to differential taxes:
*  Differential statutory tax rates: Some companies may be taxed at a different statutory
rates than others: foreign companies, private companies and smaller businesses.
*  Differential measures of income  for the corporate income tax: Some producers may be
provided exemption or more generous cost deductions compared to other producers even
though they be producing similar products. For example, a virgin material producer may
have greater (or lower) tax depreciation writeoffs for capital compared to a producer of
recyclable materials.
*  Other taxes: Some producers may be subject to taxes and levies that do not apply to
others.  For example, capital or financial transaction taxes may apply on banks but near-
banks and non-financial organizations conducting some financial activities may be
exempt from such taxes.
When a state-owned company is exempt from payment of certain taxes, it will have a
competitive advantage over investor-owned  producers. One of the objectives of privatization
is to put all producers on a "level-playing field". But would the playing field be "level" after
the privatization? Often tax policy develops overtime that results in special concessions
given to investor-owned companies so that they may compete better with state-owned
companies, including lower statutory tax rates, faster writeoffs for capital costs and
investment tax credits. If the state-owned company is to be privatized, what will be the
prevailing tax system? Should the privatized company be given similar tax relief or should
the competitors now face higher levels of taxation?
14When privatization occurs, the government may be interested in not only leveling the
playing field among producers within an industry but also across industries. If the objective
is to eliminate as many distortions as possible, the government may wish to change tax rules
that would affect the whole industry, not just the privatized company. The value of the
privatized company will depend on the differential tax burden between it and its competitors.
3.  Revenue Impacts
The third set of issues deals with revenue impacts of a privatization. As discussed above, a
government receives two forms of revenue - a cash consideration for the sale of the
privatized firms shares or assets and taxes paid by the privatized firm over time.  The actual
amount of taxes paid will depend on settlement of the aforementioned transition and tax
policy issues but there are other considerations as well. These considerations are at two
levels:
*  Other levels of government: A state-owned company may be owned by a single
government only.  Thus, the proceeds from the sale of the enterprise will accrue to the
government as owner of the company. However, when the company is privatized, taxes
may accrue to other levels of government. For example, federal and state/provincial
governments may both share the corporate income tax (as in Brazil and Argentina) and
municipal governments may have access to the property tax, which was not paid by state-
owned governments.  Should a company be privatized, the owning government may
desire a larger transaction price for the assets or shares of the state-owned company to
make up for the loss of revenue paid to other governments. The investors, however, will
not be willing to pay for a higher transaction price for shares or assets even though the tax
burden may be reduced through a higher cost basis that can be deducted for tax purpose.
15A privatization could therefore be blocked in the interest of maximizing the gains to the
selling government.
Taxes  paid to  foreign governments: When a state-owned company is privatized, some of
the shares may be sold to foreign investors. Foreign governments, such as Japan, the
United Kingdom and the United States, may permit their residents to credit withholding
taxes against personal tax owing to the home government and, in the case of corporations,
credit corporate income taxes paid abroad against corporate taxes payable at home.  To
the extent that the taxes paid by the privatized company are credited abroad, there is an
effective transfer of revenue from the foreign to the host government. A host government
may therefore be able to extract greater income taxes without affecting the offer price for
the company since the investors are able to credit income taxes against foreign tax
obligations.  This will result in greater revenues accruing to the government selling the
privatized company.
The fact that a government may have to share revenues with other governments
played a very important role in determining whether a company should be privatized and if
so, at what sell price.  It was a significant factor in deciding whether the Province of Ontario
should privatize its state-owned enterprise, Ontario Hydro. The above checklist of tax issues
can thus be well-illustrated by the case of Ontario Hydro as to be discussed in the next
section.
HI.  THE CASE OF ONTARIO HYDRO: BACKGROUND
During next few years, the Province of Ontario will introduce competition into its electricity
industry, which has been characterized by Ontario Hydro's almost century-old monopoly.
16The intensifying market competition has been the driving force to the government-initiated
transition towards a competitive electricity system in Ontario. On the other hand, Ontario
Hydro's unsatisfactory business record over the past decade has added to the pressure for
reform. There has been province-wide criticism regarding the dramatic increases in power
costs and the high wages and excess staff at Ontario Hydro. Many complaints have also
surfaced with respect to Ontario Hydro's tax-exempt status, its function as a public policy
instrument, its enormous accumulation of debt  (over $30 billion in 1997), and its lack of
stringent market accountability. To focus on the taxing issues related to privatization, we
will, in this section, first summarize Ontario Hydro's current tax status and the government's
proposed the new system, and then review taxes that are to be paid by Ontario Hydro as if it
is privatized.
1.  Ontario Hydro's current tax status
As in most countries, state-owned corporations in Canada enjoy a tax-exempt status. As
such, Ontario Hydro and municipal distributors do not pay corporate income or capital taxes
at both federal and provincial level.'0 Furthermore, according to the Power Corporation Act,
the property of these companies is not subject to taxation for municipal or school purposes
(except for local improvements). They are required to pay an amount to municipalities in lieu
of property taxes; however, this amount may be less than what they would be required to pay
as taxable corporations. Ontario Hydro is also required to pay a water rental fee to the
province for its use of publicly-owned waters in operating hydroelectric generating stations,
although it is uncertain if this payment reflects the full value of rents from using these
resources.  Thus, although reduced tax payments may allow for lower electricity rates in
10  According to the Canadian Constitution, federal and provincial governments  do not have the right to tax each
other.  As such, the federal government does not have the authority to impose taxation on provincially owned
corporations such as Ontario Hydro.
17Ontario, any such reduction in price is essentially paid for by provincial and municipal
taxpayers who forego taxes and rents for the use of their resources.
On the other hand, Ontario Hydro does pay federal and provincial payroll taxes
(Canadian Pension Plan contributions, Employer Insurance premiums and Employer Health
Tax payments). Nonetheless, Ontario Hydro has a lower tax burden compared to investor-
owned counterparts.
Besides these regular taxes, Ontario Hydro pays to the provincial government a fee
for the government's guarantee of debt repayment of Ontario Hydro equal to 0.5% of
outstanding debt. This payment is not necessarily equivalent to the risk assumed by the
province.
2.  The New System
In light of the pressures for competition, Ontario has developed a plan to introduce both
wholesale and retail competition in electricity in the year 2000. The Energy Competition Act
was introduced in June of 1998 and, when enacted, will replace the Power Corporation Act.
The Act outlines the new structure of Ontario's electricity market as well as the functions,
powers, responsibilities and objectives of each unit in the new system.  The new market will
have Ontario Hydro reorganized into four separate entities: the Ontario Electricity Generation
Corporation (OEGC), the Ontario Electric Services Corporation (OESC), the Independent
Market Operator (IMO) and the Ontario Hydro Financial Corporation (OHFC).
Under this new system, Ontario Hydro's generation facilities will be transferred to a
newly-incorporated OEGC while transmission, distribution and all other businesses of
Ontario Hydro (primarily services) will be transferred to a newly-incorporated OESC.  Since
1  The spread  in average  yield  between  the government  and  corporate  long-term  bond was  well above  0.5
percentage points over the period of 1996-98 (Bank of Canada Review). Given Ontario Hydro's leverage ratio,
18transmission (or the 'wires'  business) is by nature a monopoly, it will remain regulated but
the OESC will be required to keep this business separate from its commercial or competitive
activities through the appropriate establishment of subsidiaries. The new commercial
electricity companies will be expected to earn a normal rate of return and make dividend
payments to the Ontario government (the sole shareholder). Furthermore, the government
will phase out its guarantee on their debt by the year 2000. In the meantime, the Ontario
government proposes that Hydro would transfer a significant portion of its debt to the
government as the "stranded debt" (the debt of the Financial Corporation that cannot
reasonably be serviced and retired in a competitive electricity market).  Besides these
commercial electricity companies, the Independent Market Operator (IMO) will manage and
coordinate the electricity market.  It will run an electricity exchange, dispatch power based on
least cost bids, arrange financial settlement between buyers and sellers, forecast supply
requirements and encourage investment accordingly. According to the Act, the IMO will be
an independent, non-profit corporation without share capital and will not be an agent of the
Crown. On the other hand, Ontario Hydro Financial Corporation (OHFC) will retain and
manage Ontario Hydro's debts and will be dissolved only when substantially all its debts and
other liabilities have been retired.  During its operation however, it will be required to pay
municipal property taxes.
While Ontario Hydro has always been exempt from taxation, the enactment of the
Energy Competition Act will require the OEGC and the OESC to make payments in lieu of
federal and provincial corporate income and capital taxes. These amounts will be equal to the
amounts that the corporations would be liable to pay if they were not tax exempt.
Furthermore, municipal electricity distributors will be required to pay a prescribed percentage
of their adjusted gross revenues as well as a transfer tax upon the transfer of property to
the guarantee seems far less than what would be the monetary value of risk assured by the provincial
19anyone other than the OEGC, the OESC or another municipal electricity distributors. Finally,
all these corporations will be required to make payments in lieu of additional municipal and
school taxes (the difference between what the corporation currently pays and the amount it
would be liable to pay according to an assessment prescribed by regulation).
All of the special payments just described are to be paid to the Financial Corporation
for the purpose of paying down Ontario Hydro's stranded debt. After a date prescribed by
regulation, these amounts will be payable to the province. Any debts that cannot be
extinguished through these means is said to be "residual stranded debt" and will be serviced
by a competition transition charge on both generators and consumers.
There are also other issues to be considered, for leveling the playing field in the
industry, when Ontario Hydro be privatized and become taxable. These issues are mainly
related to historical operating losses, the stranded debt and tax related expenses such as
capital cost allowances.
3.  Taxes that would be paid should Ontario Hydro be privatized
As mentioned, Ontario Hydro would pay the following taxes if it were privatized: federal and
provincial corporate income taxes and capital taxes, municipal property taxes rather than
grants in lieu of taxes and certain transaction taxes such as land transfer fees.  12
Corporate Income Taxes. In Canada, the general corporate income tax rate is 29.12 percent
at federal level, which includes a basic rate of 28 percent and a surtax of 4 percent.  The
provincial corporate income tax, which is imposed on virtually the same base, is not
deductible from the federal tax.  In Ontario, the corporate income tax rate is 15.5 percent. As
govermment.
12  The water  rental  fees  are ignored  as we are unable  to determnine  whether  the amounts  correspond  to an
appropriate  charge  for the use of water  resources.
20a result, a combined federal and Ontario corporate income tax rate of 44.6 percent would be
applicable to the privatized Hydro.
The amount of corporate income tax paid depends on the elements of the tax base:
both income and deductions for costs. Three quarters of capital gains from the disposal of
assets is included in income. The costs of replacing fixed depreciable assets are written off
according to income tax rules, based on declining balance methods except for a few minor
classes.
According to its annual report, Hydro's main depreciable assets include hydraulic
generating stations, fossil stations, nuclear stations with heavy water as the main component,
transmission and distribution facilities, and administration and service facilities. Under the
income tax act, the tax depreciation rate is 4 percent for all the electricity generating stations,
5 percent for heavy water, and 6 percent for transmission and distribution as well as
administration and service facilities. Inventory costs are deducted according to First-in-First-
out (FIFO) principles. Interest expense is deductible so long as the income is not exempted
from taxation. Finally, Canada allows business losses to be carried forward seven years and
backward three years.
Capital Taxes. There are capital taxes payable to both federal and provincial governments
when Ontario Hydro becomes taxable. The federal government imposes a tax of 0.225
percent on taxable capital (shareholders' equity and reserves and debts, excluding accounts
payable of less than 365 days, in excess of $10 million), but this can be offset by the
corporate income surtax of 4 percent. In Ontario, corporations with total assets and gross
revenues of between $1 million and $2.3 million are taxed at a graduated rate. The general
rate is 0.3 percent, which would apply to the taxable Ontario Hydro.
21Property Taxes.  In January 1997, the Ontario government introduced the Fair Municipal
Finance Act, which established an assessment system based on current market value. Across
the province, the property tax rate on industrial and commercial properties is about 2.5
percent of market value. It will be as high as 7.64 percent in the City of Toronto in three
year's time. Ontario real property includes land, buildings, machinery, fixtures, and
structures. 13 Many of Hydro's fixed assets will be subject to the property tax.
Land Transfer Tax.  Ontario levies land transfer taxes on land and attached buildings. With a
progressive rate schedule, the general rate is 1.5 percent on transfer value above $250,000.14
This tax could be applied to the transfer of property from the government to investors.
IV.  AN ASSESSMENT OF THE TAX ISSUES
In this section, we will discuss, with Ontario Hydro as an illustrative case and following the
checklist set out in Section I, the tax-related transition, economic efficiency and revenue
issues arise from privatization.
1.  Transitional Issues
As Ontario Hydro is to be taxed according to federal and provincial laws, a number of
transition issues are raised, similar to a privatization. Depending on transitional arrangements
with respect to the pricing of assets and liabilities, Ontario Hydro may pay quite different
amounts of tax when it is assessed for corporate income and capital tax liabilities.
13  By statute, machinery and equipment used for manufacturing, farming, and mineral processing are also
assessable but are not liable to property taxation.
14  These numbers were provided by officials of the Ontario Ministry of Finance and the City of Toronto's
property tax division.
22Pricing of Assets and Income  Taxes: According to the Canadian Income Tax Act, provincial
Crown corporations that are privatized are treated as if the firm  just started up anew. Assets
are valued according to fair market value prior to their transfer to the new entities. Unlike
other restructuring of investor-owned  companies (amalgamations,  wind-ups of subsidiaries
and acquisitions), no rollover treatment is provided that would allow a provincial Crown
corporation to transfer assets at a cost basis of assets rather than their fair market value.
Given the current law, the pricing of fixed assets at fair market value rather than the
tax value of the undepreciated capital cost, may be either advantageous or disadvantageous to
Ontario Hydro. The recent mothballing of nuclear power plants had a significant impact in
reducing Hydro's fair market value of assets below cost. Moreover, tax depreciation rates for
utilities in the Canadian tax system are not all that generous. Thus, it is expected that the fair
market value is likely less than the tax cost of assets. By transferring assets to new entities at
fair market value, the value of assets for depreciation purposes are likely less than the cost
basis, thereby increasing corporate income tax liabilities over time.  On the other hand, the
use of fair market value would depress values used for the assessment of capital and property
taxes.
Treatment of historical losses: Normally, under Canadian law, when a company undergoes a
change of control, accumulated non-capital losses for tax purposes may be transferred to the
successor companies and applied against income for up to seven years earned from a similar
line of business activity. Non-capital losses can also be carried back for three years. Net
capital losses are extinguished with a change in control.
As Ontario Hydro is not undergoing a change of control (it is still owned by the
government), one could argue that both historical non-capital and capital losses are
transferable to the new taxable entities. However, when a provincial Crown corporation
23becomes taxable, a further complication arises in that there have been no previous estimation
of losses for tax purposes. Should such loss accounts be computed? Furthermore, as pointed
out below, forgiven debt should be used to reduce any loss carryovers.
Restructuring  capitalfinancing and interest  deductibility:  Historically,  Ontario  Hydro's
leverage has been over 90 percent of assets. This is not uncommon among state-owned
enterprises since debt financing is guaranteed. An extremely high debt-asset ratio, without a
government guarantee, would imply a much higher cost of capital for investors. With the
recent financial difficulties of Ontario Hydro, the debt could be more than the fair market
value of assets. Therefore, it became necessary for the government to "absorb" the
"stranded" debt to bring Ontario Hydro's debt-asset ratio closer to a "private sector" ratio. 
15
As mentioned, the government will transfer the "stranded debt" to the Ontario Hydro
Financial Corporation to bring down the generating and distribution capital financing
structure to a commercially acceptable level. The stranded debt will be covered by tax
payments made by Ontario Hydro and the competition transition charge on electricity used by
consumers. Interestingly, should Ontario Hydro becomes taxable without the government
absorbing the "stranded debt", it will take longer before it actually becomes liable for income
taxes due to the tax deductibility for debt financing cost.
The transfer of debt from the new operating companies to the financial corporation
has two important implications. First, it will allow the new companies to have a lower cost of
funds since they will be perceived by the market to be less risky.  Second, Ontario Hydro will
clearly obtain a benefit from having its stranded debt forgiven. In principle, therefore, the
value of debt forgiveness should be treated as income received that would be taxable or used
to reduce accumulated tax losses transferred to the new entities, as discussed above.
24Pension Contributions: As an employer, Ontario Hydro has contributed to the pension plans
of its workers. Pensions will be paid from the contributions and accumulated pension plan
earnings at a later time and subject to personal income taxation. Should Ontario Hydro
therefore be allowed to capitalize the value of its contributions prior to the date that it
becomes taxable so as to deduct such expenditures from corporate income tax liabilities
owing at a later time?  In principle, it seems inconsistent to allow for such pre-existing
contributions to be capitalized and deducted. The payments are in lieu of salaries and wages,
which were paid when Ontario Hydro was not taxable. It therefore seems that no particular
deduction should be provided since the same argument can be made for any non-taxable
employer that contributes to pension plans.  16
Withholding Taxes on Interest: Interest payments made by Ontario Hydro to non-residents
would be subject to tax, especially with respect to interest. However, most corporate bonds
are of terms that are more than five years. Under current Canadian law, the interest paid to
arms' length lenders for longer-term indebtedness is exempt from withholding tax. Thus, the
effect of making Ontario taxable would not likely result in withholding taxes charged for
interest payments to non-residents.
Other Issues: A few other issues will also apply to the tax treatment of Ontario Hydro. Some
issues are very technical ones. For example, debt owned by the government is not subject to
capital tax at the federal level.  As the Ontario Hydro debt still remains with the Ontario
15 We understand that the expected debt-to-asset ratio for the generation company would be about 33% and the
distribution company would be over 40%.
16  This issue arose with one recent privatization in Canada. The company was permitted to deduct the
accumulated amount of contributions paid to employee pension plans prior to the privatization.  This resulted in
the virtual elimination of corporate income taxes paid by the company for a substantial amount of time.
25government as financial holding company, it may be viewed that such debt should be exempt
from capital tax.  Other issues are related to future restructuring of Hydro. For example,
companies can reduce taxes if interest or lease payments are made on a tax-free basis to trusts
owned by pension plans. As another example, companies could be split between operating
and managerial entities. The operating company pays fees to the managerial company and
each owning manager can receive up to $500,000 in tax-free capital gains on a lifetime basis
so long as the company is a Canadian-controlled closely-held  corporation.  Should Ontario
Hydro be able to exploit tax minimizing strategies to reduce payments made overtime?
In conclusion, a number of important transition issues are to be settled to determine
the total amount of taxes to be paid by successor corporations to Ontario Hydro. To the
extent that the issues are determined on a favourable basis for Ontario Hydro, then the
Ontario government will receive less income to recover the cost of stranded debt or, once the
stranded debt is paid off, as receipts for the Ontario treasury.
2.  Implications for Economic Efficiency
As discussed above, taxes affect economic efficiency by distorting the allocation of resources
in the economy. There are two forms of tax distortions that are particularly important: factor-
use and competitiveness amongst producers. To evaluate the impact of the tax system on the
use of resources, we compute the marginal effective tax rate. The marginal effective tax rate
is the amount of corporate income, capital, and property taxes paid as a proportion of income
eamed on marginal investment projects. For example, if a company earns a 20% before-tax
rate of return on capital and receives a 10% after-tax rate of return in capital, then the
effective tax rate is 50%.
26Factor-use Distortions: To illustrate the impact of taxability, Table 1 provides estimates of
marginal effective tax rates on capital for two different cases: fully taxpaying case and tax
loss case. The fully taxpaying case assumes that Ontario Hydro will generate taxable income
under the proposed new system. The tax loss case is modeled as one particular situation
whereby Ontario Hydro is able to carry forward its prior years' losses to shelter future
income from corporate income taxation. 17 Capital and property taxes are payable even
though the company may not pay corporate income taxes until a later time.
Appendix A provides details of the model for calculating marginal effective tax rates.
It is assumed that Ontario Hydro will be subject to corporate income, capital and property
taxes according to the normal tax laws. It is also assumed that Ontario Hydro will have a
commercially acceptable capital financing structure with a debt to assets ratio at about 33 per
cent (generation) or 40 percent (transmission and distribution). If Ontario Hydro is able to
carry forward losses from earlier years, it is assumed that it will take seven years to write off
such losses.'8
As shown in Table 1, there would be quite significant differences in effective tax rates
on capital for particular assets. For the tax-paying case, machinery used for distribution bears
the lowest effective tax rate (36%) while nuclear structure for generation would be subject to
the highest effect tax rate (68% for the corresponding case). Structures tend to be highly
taxed since they are provided a relatively low capital cost allowance (4% or 5% on declining
balance basis) which is not altogether that much different than economic depreciation.
Moreover, such assets are subject to relatively high property and capital taxes. Similar results
hold for the non-tax paying case (Table 2).
17  There are other possible scenarios such as Ontario Hydro shifting from taxpaying to non-taxpaying states
frequently. See Altshuler and Auerbach [1990] for further discussion.
I  This estimate is adopted from Chen and Mintz [1993b].
27Making Ontario Hydro taxable will now distort its decisions to reduce nuclear power
in favour of hydraulic power. The tax system will also encourage Hydro to substitute
equipment for structures in production process. Thus, as a long run policy measure, the
Ontario government may wish to change its policies to reduce disparities in effective tax rates
on assets. In particular, municipal property taxes are quite high on commercial and industrial
property - they therefore discourage the use of structures that are subject to such high rates of
tax.  Such changes in the tax system would have a significant impact on the amount of taxes
to be paid overtime.
Competitiveness in the Industry: The tax system can distort competitive condition in an
industry. Power is supplied by large provincial Crown corporations (hydraulic and nuclear)
in competition with small producers (primarily small hydro and alternative fuels).  Over the
years, the tax system has provided for several tax incentives for independent power producers
so that they may more effectively compete with state-owned firms.  The most important
incentive has been energy conservation equipment that at one time was written off over two
years on a straight-line basis but now receives a 30% declining balance deduction, which is
far more generous than the 4% to 6% declining balance deduction afforded to large
producers. The assets that qualify for the more generous treatment include electrical
generation, related transmission and interconnection equipment, assets used for fossil fuel
projects, most structures and equipment associated with hydroelectric projects (up to 15 MW)
and generating equipment using alternative power resources (e.g., wind and solar).
With the advent of improving competitiveness in the industry, the tax system, if
remaining the same, could result in a distortion between the new Ontario Hydro entities and
independent power producers (which are with smaller capacity and/or alternative power
resources). As shown in Table 3, with the various cases, Ontario Hydro is subject to much
28greater levels of tax compared to small producers, especially because of the more generous
treatment of depreciation for capital cost allowances for smaller producers. Although the
taxability of Ontario Hydro improves competitiveness in principle, a continuation of the
existing corporate tax policies would provide much more favourable treatment for
independent power producers.
One of the reasons for introducing competition for power supply in Ontario is to
foster competition for Ontario Hydro in US markets. Table 3 also compares the effective tax
rates faced by Ontario Hydro with US competitors. In this case, Ontario Hydro will face
much higher effective tax rates on capital compared to producers from the United States. US
producers face a lower corporate income tax rate, no capital tax and lower property taxes
compared to public utility companies in Canada.  19  Canada's tax system will put Ontario
Hydro on a non-competitive footing with power producers from the United States.
In summary, we come to the following conclusions regarding the role of tax policy in
terms of economic efficiency:
(1) If Ontario Hydro is taxable, an important question is whether the fast writeoffs granted to
independent power producers would also be available to Hydro. As noted above, under
current law, conservation equipment is limited to small hydraulic projects and is
unavailable for assets used to produce nuclear power. If Ontario Hydro is taxable under
current law, it is clear that Ontario Hydro assets would not qualify for faster tax
incentives provided to independent power producers unless there was a change to tax
policy. However, if the fast writeoffs were available to large provincial Crown
corporations, then there would be a significant amount of tax losses generated within the
corporate income tax system as a whole. This would result in an unstable corporate tax
29system since companies would try to transfer to other taxable entities that have taxable
income to absorb tax losses.
(2)  Ontario Hydro's privatization is partly motivated by the deregulation of the electricity
industry. However, an open-border electricity market implies that the privatized Ontario
Hydro will have to compete with not only domestic firms but also major US electricity
exporters along the border. As our estimates show, the US generators and distributors
certainly possess tax advantages over a taxable Ontario Hydro if it is privatized.
3.  Revenue Impacts
It is not possible for us to provide an estimate of the amount of taxes Ontario Hydro's new
entities will pay to the Ontario government. It is clear that a number of transition issues
would need to be considered and there is no data that would allow us to make such an
estimate easily.  However, if it is assumed that the current value of book profits and assets
(excluding one-time changes) are the base for the amount of taxes to be paid, Ontario would
pay about $235 million in federal and provincial corporate and capital taxes and $180 million
in property taxes.
As part of its reform, the Ontario government rejected the option of privatizing
Ontario Hydro. Prior to its election, the government proposed privatizing a number of
provincial Crown corporations but decided not to proceed with the program. It seemed that
the government had a rather large agenda for change in the province and was less willing to
undertake privatization during its restructuring of government services. However, as a result
of large losses incurred by Ontario Hydro with its nuclear program, the government
undertook significant reform of the power industry but without the privatization of Ontario
'9 See also  the report  of the Technical  Committee  on Business  Taxation  [1998]  that  showed  that  the effective  tax
rate  on capital  as well as costs  of production  is much  higher  in Canada  compared  to the United  States.
30Hydro. Arguably, a primary reason for not proceeding with privatization of Ontario Hydro
was that a significant amount of tax revenue would be paid to the federal government.
The federal government would have received about 50% of revenues paid by Ontario
Hydro should the privatization have gone through. By making Ontario Hydro taxable but
still operate as a Crown corporation, the province would be able to keep the revenues within
the province.
The province is also ensuring that property taxes would be paid to the province, not
the municipalities. In Canada, the provinces have full control of municipalities that are
"creatures" of the province. Under Section 86 of the new Act, both the generation and
distribution subsidiaries and every municipal electrical utility will make payments to the
financial corporation (holding the stranded debt) in lieu of taxes payable to municipalities and
for school purposes. 20 It is likely that the grants paid to municipalities in lieu of property
taxes would remain the same.
V.  CONCLUSIONS
Many less developed countries have been privatizing their state-owned companies to improve
the competitiveness of the electricity power markets. Taxation is rarely thought of during
privatization exercises except to determine the offer price of the privatized company.
This paper illustrates that there are a number of significant tax issues faced by
policymakers when applying tax law to newly-privatized companies. There are transition
issues such as those related to the valuation of assets, carryover of loss deductions, employer
pension contributions, withholding taxes and other taxes such as property taxes. There are
economic efficiency issues related to taxation that may require adjustments to tax policies
over time.  These issues include tax distortions related to the use of factors in production and
31competitiveness among domestic and foreign producers. Finally, there are issues related to
the distribution of tax revenue, particularly with respect to payments made to other
governments.
The case of Ontario Hydro serves to highlight a number of these above issues.
Ontario Hydro will not be privatized but it will become taxable. The taxes to be paid will
depend on how transition is to be treated. There will also be some significant pressures at a
later time potentially resulting from much higher taxes paid by Ontario Hydro compared to
independent power producers and US competitors. Tax policy will be a key determinant to
the future development of the industry.
20 This  payment  applies  for land  and  buildings  used  for generating  station  buildings,  and  transforming  and
auxiliary  equipment  and  machinery.
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Marginal Effective Tax Rate on Capital (in percent)
Ontario  Hydro  for Different Cases  of Property  and Capital  Tax Liabilities
Including  Excluding  Excluding property
All taxes  property  tax  and capital taxes
A.  Generation
Hydraulic  66.0  52.6  29.4
Fossil  67.6  55.7  36.0
Nuclear  68.2  56.7  38.2
Heavy  water  63.5  49.7  267
Buildings  65.9  52.4  28.9
Machinery  & Equipment  39.3  39.3  26.9
Inventory  42.1  42.1  39.9
Aggregate  67.1  55.2  36.0
B. Distribution
Transmission  & distribution  60.7  46.4  23.0
Buildings  64.7  50.0  23.6
Machinery  & Equipment  35.6  35.6  21.6
Aggregate  60.2  46.1  23.0
33Table 2
Marginal Effective Tax Rate on Capital (in percent)





Hydraulic  66.0  62.5
Fossil  67.6  63.6
Nuclear  68.2  64.0
Heavy water  63.5  60.1
Buildings  65.9  62.5
Machinery & Equipment  39.3  44.5
Inventory  42.1  27.6
Aggregate  67.1  63.0
B. Distribution
Transmission & distribution  60.7  57.3
Buildings  64.7  61.5
Machinery & Equipment  35.6  42.4
Aggregate  60.2  57.0
34Table  3
Marginal  Effective Tax Rate on Capital  (in percent)
Comparing  Ontario  Hydro with  Smaller Canadian
Producers  and US  Competitors
Ontario  Small Canadian  US
Hydro  Producers  Competitors
A.  Generation
Hydraulic  66.0  -7.8  37.0
Fossil  67.6  -3.9  40.9
Nuclear  68.2  NA  42.3
Heavy  water  63.5  NA  37.5
Buildings  65.9  33.8  36.7
Machinery  & Equipment  39.3  29.5  8.3
Inventory  42.1  42.1  34.1
Aggregate  67.1  -2.4  40.9
B. Distribution
Transmission  & distribution  60.7  -12.5  25.7
Buildings  64.7  29.0  33.2
Machinery  & Equipment  35.6  24.6  1.9
Aggregate  60.2  -9.9  25.1
35APPENDIX A
Methodology on Estimate of Marginal Effective Tax Rate
This appendix provides formulas and explanations for METR calculation. The standard
method used to estimate marginal effective tax rates has been extensively documented.
The marginal effective tax rate on capital measures the impact of a tax system on an
incremental capital investment. It incorporates the effects of not only investment-related
statutory tax rates and other tax treatments (e.g. tax depreciation, tax credit, tax deductibility,
tax holidays, etc.) but also various economic factors interacting with these tax treatments (e.g.
financial costs, the inflation rate, and the structure of investment, etc.) In other words, the
marginal effective tax rate is a summary indicator of the overall tax burden imposed by a tax
system on a new investment in a certain economic environment.  Numerically, it is a
percentage expression of the difference between gross-of-tax rate of return on the capital and
net-of-tax rate of return on capital divided by the net-of-tax rate of return on capital.
The following are general fornulas used in this study.
1. Marginal effective tax rate (t)
As aforementioned, the marginal effective tax rate, t, on a given type of capital is defined as
the proportional difference between the gross-of-tax rate of return (rG)  and the net-of-tax rate
of return  (rN). That is
t =  (rG  - rN)IrA  (1)
rN is the weighted average of the return to debt and equity securities required by the financial
investor. rG is the difference between the marginal revenue product (or user cost, in
equilibrium) and economic depreciation. As shown below, one of the main components of rG
is the real cost of financing, 7.
2.  The net-of-tax rate of return on capital (FN)
The formula for net-of-tax rate of return, rnv,  is
r1V=8i +  (1 -O8P- )r(2)
This is the rate of return on capital required by suppliers of investment funds.
21  Formal derivations  may be found in  Boadway, Bruce, and Mintz [19841,  and Mintz and Purvis (1986]. For
tax-loss case, refer to Chen and Mintz [1993a].
363.  The real cost of financing (if)
The  real cost of financing (rf) is defined by
rf =  J3i  (l - U) + (I -O3)P  - )r  (3)
with  A = debt to assets ratio, i = cost of debt,  U= the statutory corporate income tax rate
which indicates, in the formula, the interest deductibility for corporate income tax purpose, p
= cost of equity, and  r= inflation rate. That is, the cost of financing for a real capital investor
is the weighted-average cost of financing net of inflation rate.
4. The gross-of-tax rate of return (rG)  on capital
a  Depreciable assets
rG = (l+t)(rl+&+h)(]- k)[I -A+  (l -U)/( a+ +)]/(I  -U) + tp -6-h  (4)
with ts = tax on transfer of property, or sales tax on capital goods where is applicable, 8=
economic depreciation rate, h = capital risk,  k = investment tax credit rate, A = present tax
value of the accumulated capital cost allowance = Ua(l+rf+a)/(a+rf+;r), a= tax
depreciation rate, 8 = capital tax rate, and tp = property tax rate.
b.  Inventory
For inventory,
rG  =  (l  tJ(rf  +h  +U7J/(1-U)  + 8 - h  (5)
with t, = sales tax on inventory where it is applicable, and  I=  1 for FIFO accounting method
and 0 for LIFO indicating that FIFO will result in a taxation on inflated profits when inflation
rate (z) is greater than zero.
C. Land
For land,
rG =  (I +td)(rl + h)[l  + 8 (1-U)/(rf+±r)]/(l-U)  +  ±p  - h(6)
with t, = tax on transfer of property, particularly land.
5.  Aggregation
The METR on capital, tc, is the proportional difference between the weighted average of
gross-of-tax rates of return and the net-of-tax rate of return on all types of assets. As the net-
of-tax rate of return is the same across asset type within a given country, t, can be calculated
as
37tC=  §i  Wi [(rGi - rNi)/rAi  ]=  (L rGi Wi  - rN)/rN  (7)
where i denotes asset type (i.e., buildings, machinery, inventories, and land in our case), wi
denotes  the weight  of asset  type i.
The above  are general  format  of formulas  used for METR  on capital.  Due to the variance
among  different  jurisdictions,  some  variables  in the formulas  can be zero  for some
jurisdictions.  For example,  in our case  study,  since  sales  taxes  have little  impact  on capital
goods  and taxes  on transfer  of land  are ignored,  t, = 0 in the above  formulas.
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